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Internal Realism and the Problem of Religious 
Diversity 
 
Abstract 
 
This article applies Hilary Putnam’s theory of internal realism to the issue of religious plurality. 
The result of this application—“internalist pluralism”—constitutes a paradigm shift within the 
Philosophy of Religion. Moreover, internalist pluralism succeeds in avoiding the major 
difficulties faced by John Hick’s famous theory of religious pluralism, which views God, or “the 
Real”, as the noumenon lying behind diverse religious phenomena. In side-stepping the 
difficulties besetting Hick’s revolutionary Kantian approach, without succumbing to William 
Alston’s critique of conceptual-scheme dependence, internalist pluralism provides a solution to 
significant theoretical problems, while doing so in a manner that is respectful of cultural 
diversity and religious sensitivities. 
 
 
As societies become increasingly multicultural, there progressively arises a need for an 
appropriate theory that is capable of making sense of the various difficulties presented by 
religious diversity. To be precise, what seems to be required at this historical juncture is a 
theory of religious pluralism that is suitably sensitive to the challenge posed by cultural 
diversity, while remaining respectful of religious differences.
1
 Clearly, a theory that reduces 
the beliefs of other cultures to inferior versions of one’s own—never mind to some perversion 
of it—fails to meet this seemingly growing need. In what follows, I adumbrate a theory that 
may well meet it. The theory, which I call “internalist pluralism”, aims to provide, given the 
tremendous diversity of belief systems, a philosophical account of the various and apparently 
divergent claims made by religious believers, while simultaneously avoiding the difficulties 
incurred by previous approaches to this problem. In particular, internalist pluralism is offered 
as an alternative theory of religious pluralism to that famously developed by John Hick,
2
 and 
                                                 
1
The need for a political philosophy that is sensitive to cultural diversity and religious differences is, of course, a 
key motivation behind John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
2
See, for example: John Hick, God has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974); John Hick, Problems of 
Religious Pluralism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985); and John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: 
Human Responses to the Transcendent (London: Macmillan, 1989). 
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it aspires to avoid the considerable weaknesses in Hick’s otherwise attractive theory. 
 
John Hick’s “Copernican Revolution” in the Philosophy of Religion 
 
In order to appreciate the need for a new theory of religious pluralism, let me begin by 
considering Hick’s attempt at making sense of the diversity of religious truth-claims. 
 Hick’s profound originality consisted in applying certain Kantian metaphysical insights to 
the Philosophy of Religion. In a nutshell, Hick proposed what he considered to be “a 
Copernican Revolution” within the discipline. In the Ptolemaic system of astronomy the earth 
was thought to be at the center of the universe, with all the other planets revolving around it. 
Thus, applied to religion, Christianity was regarded as the center of the universe of faiths. On 
the later Copernican view, by contrast, the sun occupies the central place, and all other 
planets, including the earth, revolve around the sun. Thus, by analogy, Christianity is in orbit 
around God, or “the Real”, along with the rest of the world faiths. The message is clear: 
Christianity must no longer be considered essentially unique and essentially privileged. It is 
part of a family of world religions which are all equally orbiting around God, or “the Real”. 
 This Copernican revolution in the Philosophy of Religion is premised upon a Kantian 
metaphysic that sharply distinguishes between the phenomenal and noumenal realms. Kant 
believed that humans could, in principle, know only the phenomenal realm; the noumenal 
things-in-themselves being intrinsically inaccessible. Applied to religion, the 
Copernican/Kantian view takes the phenomena to be the mooted objects purportedly 
identified by the adherents of the various world religions, and the noumenon to be God in 
Godself, or “the Real”. So all humans can ever know is the differing phenomena recognized 
within the world’s varied religious traditions. It is impossible to step outside of these 
traditions and identify the ultimate objects or their source. Given this veil of ignorance, as it 
were, Hick invites us to apply a principle of charity, and to accept that all of the world’s 
religions are equally worthy of belief. Each offers an authentic way of achieving the religious 
goal. 
 Hick, in purportedly advancing from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican worldview, thus 
presents his theory as a paradigm shift.
3
 Moreover, he criticizes the Ptolemaic 
(Christianity/earth-centered) paradigm because it must posit an ever-increasing number of ad 
hoc hypotheses in order to account for anomalies. Unfortunately, Hick’s Copernican/Kantian 
                                                 
3
See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970). 
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paradigm has also suffered a similar theoretical deterioration. For it could itself be described 
in Lakatos’ terms as a degenerating problem shift
4
—one that has been forced to propose ever 
more seemingly ad hoc hypotheses in order to account for troublesome data. Specifically, 
Hick has made two major ad hoc adjustments to his original God-centered, 
Copernican/Kantian paradigm: 
 
  (1)  in order to accommodate non-theistic forms of Buddhism, it became necessary for 
“God” to be characterized as “the Real”; and 
(2) in order to account for a greater range of religious perspectives, “the Real” has had 
to be so interpreted that it may be construed as capable of generating both personal 
and impersonal religious phenomena. 
 
Both of these adjustments to Hick’s original hypothesis have been attended by a host of 
difficulties, which in turn demand further adjustments to the thesis in order to account for 
them. Later, I shall outline the major difficulties confronting Hickean pluralism. 
 Perhaps, then, given that there are major difficulties with Hick’s approach, the time has 
come to move on to a new paradigm? After all, the Copernican paradigm in astronomy is 
itself now outdated. If we ask an astronomer of today where the center of the universe is, she 
might say that it is the point mid-way between the most distant particles of matter. She might 
say that it is wherever the “Big Bang” originated. She might even say that the universe has no 
center. What she would certainly not say is that the center of the universe is the small sun 
located in the middle of our minor solar system.
5
 
 By way of a “post-Copernican” paradigm shift, what I propose is a new research program 
within the Philosophy of Religion—one that is based upon Hilary Putnam’s theory of internal 
realism.
6
 I suggest that this alternative theoretical approach, with certain modifications, offers 
                                                 
4
See Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs” in Imre Lakatos and 
Alan Musgrave (edd.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
5
Perhaps it should give us cause for reflection that it took 250 years to apply Kant’s metaphysics to the 
Philosophy of Religion. And it may well be that the field lags a long way behind developments in scientific 
thinking. Hence, suggesting another paradigm shift at this stage might be described as working at break-neck 
speed! On the other hand, it may well be that a paradigm-shift in the Philosophy of Religion is long overdue, 
given that the Copernican/Kantian revolution within the discipline occurred so late. And we might not be that 
surprised at the lateness of this revolution if we share Ernst Käsemann’s view of Theology, from where many 
philosophers of religion are drawn, as an academic nature reserve. 
6
Interestingly, a number of the core feature of Putnam’s internal realism were anticipated by the Swiss theologian 
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the prospect of the best theory of religious pluralism (“the best” in the sense of being the most 
coherent and economical). But before I explain how Putnam’s internal realism is pertinent to 
the issue of religious plurality,
7
 first allow me to offer a brief characterization of his theory. 
 
Putnam’s internal realism 
 
Putnam, in the middle period of his work, famously contrasts “internal realism” with 
“metaphysical realism”. The form of metaphysical realism Putnam singles out for attention 
holds three core claims: (1) that the world consists of a fixed totality of mind-independent 
objects; (2) that there is exactly one true and complete description of the way the world is; 
and (3) that truth involves some sort of correspondence. Internal realism rejects all three 
doctrines.
8
 
 In rejecting metaphysical realism, the internal realist aims to break away from the 
dichotomy between “objective” and “subjective” notions of truth and reason as they have 
been typically construed within modern Western analytic philosophy. Putnam’s aim is to 
provide an alternative account of objectivity, truth, and associated notions, while denying that 
there is a correspondence between statements, on the one hand, and some mind-independent 
reality, on the other.
9
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hans Urs von Balthasar. See Victoria S. Harrison, The Apologetic Value of Human Holiness (Dorderecht: 
Kluwer, 2000). 
7
It should be noted that Michael Dummett has argued that adopting anti-realism in one domain does not commit 
one to its global adoption. See Michael Dummett, “The Reality of the Past”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society (1968–1969): 239–258. Hence, for parallel reasons, it could be argued that adopting internal realism in 
the religious domain does not commit one to global internal realism. In other words, localized internal realism 
seems consistent with alternative metaphysical commitments in other domains. In my view, due to the peculiar 
nature of religious language and religious “facts”, the religious domain is particularly appropriate for an internal 
realist analysis. I argue elsewhere that the moral domain is also susceptible to a similar analysis. 
8
See Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 49. 
9
The internal realist perspective was advanced by Putnam as early as 1976. In his article “Realism and Reason”, 
American Philosophical Association Proceedings 50 (1976–77): 483–498, he defends the view that all situations 
have a variety of correct descriptions, and that even descriptions that, taken as a whole, convey the same 
information may differ in what they take to be “objects”. Commenting later on this view, Putnam writes: “If there 
isn’t one single privileged sense of the word ‘object’ and one privileged totality of ‘intrinsic properties’, but 
there is only an inherently extendible notion of ‘object’ and various properties that may be seen as ‘intrinsic’ in 
different inquiries, then the very notion of a totality of all objects and of the one description that captures the 
intrinsic properties of those objects should be seen to be nonsense from the start”. Hilary Putnam, “The Question 
 5
 Why does Putnam refer to this view as “internal realism”? Because it holds that the 
question “What objects does the world consist of?” is only intelligible within a conceptual 
scheme.
10
 Moreover, not only is it the case that the objects which the world is thought to 
contain differ according to which scheme is employed,
11
 but also what is true of those objects 
equally depends upon the particular conceptual scheme. Hence, “truth” does not consist in 
correspondence to some pre-given objects, for the objects that are deemed to exist are, in 
some sense, conceptual-scheme dependent. Rather, “truth” is to be understood as “idealized 
rational acceptability”
12
—that is, “some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other 
and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented in our belief 
system”.
13
 
 Note that truth is not simply rational acceptability—that is, that what is true is not 
reducible to what it is rationally acceptable to believe at any given time. Putnam’s argument 
for rejecting any such identification is that truth, while being a property of certain statements, 
is supposed to be one that cannot be lost; whereas justification may be forfeited. (For 
example, the acquisition of further information might render it no longer rational to accept a 
claim that one was formerly rational in accepting.) Therefore, truth and justification cannot be 
identical.
14
 So, a commitment to the characterization of truth as a property which cannot be 
lost by any statement that possesses it is enough by itself to avoid the conflation of truth and 
rational acceptability. Thus, while rejecting traditional versions of realism, Putnam’s theory 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Realism” in James Conant (ed.), Words and Life (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1994), pp. 304f. 
10
See Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, op. cit., p. 49. 
11
“In The Many Faces of Realism I described in detail a case in which the same situation, in a perfectly 
commonsensical sense of ‘the same situation’, can be described as involving entirely different numbers and kinds 
of objects (colored ‘atoms’ alone, versus colored atoms plus ‘aggregates’ of atoms)”. Hilary Putnam, Renewing 
Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 120. 
12
For a defense of a modified version of the idealization theory of truth, see Crispin Wright, “Truth as Sort of 
Epistemic: Putnam’s Peregrinations”, The Journal of Philosophy XCVII, 6 (2000): 335–364. But see Hilary 
Putnam, “When ‘Evidence Transcendence’ is not Malign: A Reply to Crispin Wright”, The Journal of 
Philosophy XCVIII, 11 (2001): 594–600. 
13
Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, op. cit., pp. 49f. 
14
See ibid. In so arguing, Putnam is distancing his internal realism from Dummett’s anti-realism. Dummett 
reduces truth to what one is warranted in asserting. But if “truth” is equated with “warranted assertibility”, then 
because there are some claims that one is neither warranted in asserting nor warranted in denying, they are 
neither true nor false. This constitutes the basis of semantic anti-realism. See, for example, Dummett, “The 
Reality of the Past”, op. cit. 
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nevertheless claims to reserve the right to be viewed as a variety of realism, because it retains 
the distinction between truth and justification. And the hallmark of realism is often held to be 
precisely a distinction between truth and justification, or, conversely, the hallmark of anti-
realism is often held to be the reduction of truth to justification.
15
 
 But while Putnam is a realist in distinguishing between truth and justification, he 
nevertheless rejects the view that truth is somehow independent of all conceptual schemes or 
that it is tied to one, and only one, conceptual scheme—the supposedly correct one. How, 
then, is the distinction between truth and rational acceptability to be maintained within any 
conceptual scheme? As we have noted, the distinction is to be maintained by regarding truth 
as an idealization of rational acceptability. In other words, truth is to be viewed as inhabiting 
epistemically ideal conditions, of which, unfortunately, there are none.
16
 Even though this 
might suggest that truth is unattainable, the idealization theory of truth incorporates two key 
features that enable us to make truth-claims. The first is that truth is independent of 
justification here and now, but not, in principle, independent of all justification. Rather, to 
claim that a statement is true is to claim that it could, in principle if not in fact, be justified.
17
 
The second is that the truth-claims within a particular conceptual scheme that are most likely 
to be true will be those that are stable or “convergent”.
18
 
  
                                                 
15
See note 34, below. 
16
Putnam: “What this shows, in my opinion, is not that the externalist view is right after all, but that truth is an 
idealization of rational acceptability. We speak as if there were such things as epistemically ideal conditions, and 
we call a statement ‘true’ if it would be justified under such conditions. ‘Epistemically ideal conditions’, of 
course, are like ‘frictionless planes’: we cannot really attain epistemically ideal conditions, or even be absolutely 
certain that we have come sufficiently close to them. But frictionless planes cannot really be attained either, and 
yet talk of frictionless planes has ‘cash value’ because we can approximate them to a very high degree of 
approximation”. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, op. cit., p. 55. 
17
By way of clarification, Putnam has, more recently, insisted that in Reason, Truth and History he “proposed to 
identify ‘being true’ not with ‘being verified’, as Dummett does, but with ‘being verified to a sufficient degree to 
warrant acceptance under sufficiently good epistemic conditions’”. And as he adds in a footnote: “For Dummett, 
a sentence is, in general, either (conclusively) verified or it is not (apart from vagueness). For me, verification 
was (and is) a matter of degree”. Hilary Putnam, “Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers 
of the Human Mind”, The Dewey Lectures 1994, Lecture I, “The Antinomy of Realism”, The Journal of 
Philosophy 91 (1994): 461. 
18
See Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, op. cit., p. 56. 
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Internalist pluralism 
 
Let us now return to the problem posed by religious diversity. Hick saw lying before him 
three serious alternatives which, he presumed, exhausted all possibilities: either (i) we 
dismiss all religious experience as mere illusion; or (ii) we unjustifiably assert that the 
religious experiences of adherents to one faith are veridical and those of adherents to other 
religious traditions are not; or (iii) if we are to take the other-worldly reality of the divine as 
seriously as believers do, then we must postulate a noumenon behind the numinous. 
 Hick rejects (i) because, in his view, neither religious thought nor experience is, “as such, 
a matter of delusion and projection”.
19
 Rather, he claims, they mediate “a real contact with a 
higher reality”.
20
 He rejects (ii) because our religious views seem most to depend upon the 
particular background into which we were born. It therefore seems safe to assume that if we 
had been born into a different society, then we would hold different religious convictions and 
would thus be far more inclined to accept the experiences of adherents to the religious 
tradition of that society as veridical. Yet it seems unjustifiable simply to assume that we were 
born into the right background.
21
 Hick thus opts for (iii). However, there is another 
alternative—internalist pluralism—one that Hick, evidently, had not considered. 
 An internal realist holds not only that the objects which are deemed to exist are dependent 
upon the conceptual scheme employed, but also that the very notion of “existence” is equally 
conceptual-scheme dependent.
22
 For consider Putnam’s original example of a world 
comprising three colored “atoms”. In the conceptual scheme of “the Carnapian Logician”, 
they constitute all the objects that exist. However, in the conceptual scheme of “the Polish 
Logician”—one that counts aggregates along with atoms—seven objects exist: three 
individual atoms, three pairs of atoms and one trio. Hence, not only is it the case that what 
counts as an “object” is conceptual-scheme dependent, but it is equally the case that what 
counts as “existing” is dependent upon the conceptual scheme employed. And thus it makes 
no sense to talk of anything existing outside of all conceptual schemes. In a word, reality is 
conceptual-scheme dependent. 
 This implies that there is no way of intelligibly discussing what exists in a manner that is 
                                                 
19
Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, op. cit., pp. 102f. 
20
Ibid. 
21
See, for example, John Hick, “The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism”, Faith and Philosophy 
14, 3 (1997): 281. 
22
Eli Hirsch refers to this as “quantifier variation”. 
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conceptual-scheme neutral. What happens when we apply this conclusion to religion? A 
thoroughgoing internal realist should, to be consistent, recognize that the existence of 
purported religious realities can only be meaningfully discussed within a particular conceptual 
scheme or, what we might call, a “faith-stance”.
23
 For it would make no sense to talk of “the 
Real” as existing outside of any faith-stance.
24
 But given different faith-stances—in other 
words, given different conceptual schemes—this suggests the possibility of different realities 
and different truths.
25
 
 In short, just as the truths within the conceptual scheme of “the Carnapian Logician” 
differ substantively from those within the conceptual scheme of “the Polish Logician”, the 
truths within one religious tradition may differ substantively from those within another. But 
as with the case of the two logicians, this does not entail that either set of religious claims 
thereby necessarily fail to be genuine truths. Moreover, if two different sets of religious 
claims both comprise truths, they would remain truths without any form of correspondence to 
some reality outside of all religious or secular belief systems. Indeed, from the standpoint of 
internal realism, there is no reality “existing” outside of our conceptual schemes. A religious 
belief system is thus, in a sense, a self-contained world. And there is a plurality of such belief 
systems. Hence, this constitutes a theory of religious pluralism—what we might appropriately 
call “internalist pluralism”—that is neither “Ptolemaic” nor “Copernican”. Rather, it seems 
more “Einsteinian”. 
 Internalist pluralism might thus allow one to say, for example, that within the conceptual 
scheme of Shaivite Hinduism, Shiva is a real, objectively-existing God; while within the 
conceptual scheme of Roman Catholicism, the Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit objectively 
                                                 
23
See Harrison, Apologetic Value, ibid.. 
24
A further implication of this analysis, which I cannot elaborate here, is that the “common-core thesis” of 
religious experience, which many philosophers of religion subscribe to, is erroneous. For a critical discussion of 
the “common-core thesis”, see Peter Moore, “Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, Mystical Technique” in 
Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 
101–131. 
25
This follows from the claim that what it means for a religious object to exist is stipulated within a religious 
conceptual scheme. An important example is the way that the existence of God has been variously understood 
within the monotheistic religions. Debates within the religious traditions themselves about the meaning of 
“existence” when applied to God strongly suggest that one cannot legitimately impose a concept of “existence” 
from outside the relevant conceptual scheme. Nor ought one to assume that one understands what believers are 
claiming without an in-depth study of their respective theologies.  
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exists.
26
 But what one could not do is intelligibly discuss the qualities of, for example, Shiva 
from within a conceptual scheme, such as a Christian one,
27
 in which Shiva occupies no 
place. It follows that there can be no legitimate dispute between those within different belief 
systems about the objectivity of their respective claims unless they genuinely enter into each 
other’s belief systems.
28
 For example, consider the case of a Christian asserting that Jesus is 
the Son of God, and a Muslim replying: “No, he isn’t!” They may not, in fact, be disagreeing, 
but merely talking past each other (just as “the Polish Logician” is not actually contradicting 
“the Carnapian Logician” in denying that in a world of three atoms there are only three 
objects).
29
 In this way, internal realism can be employed to generate a radical theory of 
religious pluralism—internalist pluralism. 
 Internalist pluralism, moreover, unlike certain other theories of religious pluralism, does 
not amount simply to philosophical relativism about religious beliefs. Philosophical relativists 
typically deny that objective truth is attainable. The internalist pluralist, on the other hand, can 
talk about objective truth—even though it remains objective truth only within some 
conceptual scheme. For when the Carnapian looks at a world comprising only three atoms 
and states that that world only contains three objects, the statement is objectively true. There 
are not four objects within that world if one employs the Carnapian conceptual scheme. But 
equally, when the Polish Logician looks at a world comprising three atoms, and states that 
                                                 
26
A fuller treatment would clarify the relationship between religious conceptual schemes and the world religions 
as lived and practiced. Suffice it to say that a subscriber to internalist pluralism is not committed to regarding 
“religious conceptual schemes” and “religions” as synonymous. 
27
Note: I do not say “the” Christian conceptual scheme, for it cannot simply be presumed that all Christians, 
merely because they all refer to themselves by the same name, share the same conceptual scheme. The same can 
be said of all major religions. 
28
What constitutes genuinely entering into a belief system? One is not compelled to become an advocate of “the 
Polish Logician’s” conceptual scheme in order to understand his claims. Hence, internalist pluralism is not 
committed to the claim that one must become an adherent of a particular religious belief system before one can 
understand it. One might achieve a sympathetic understanding of a belief system by, for example, studying its 
intellectual components, familiarizing oneself with relevant ethnological research, talking to people who 
subscribe to it, and reading accounts of their experiences, etc. Autobiographies are especially useful for 
inducting an “outsider” into the thought-worlds of their authors. It would be difficult to read, for example, Sun 
Chief: The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian, without gaining some insight into what it feels like to adhere to the 
Hopi belief system. See Leo W. Simmons (ed.), Sun Chief: The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1942). 
29
However, it is also possible for there to be a genuine disagreement. See note 40, below. I am merely pointing 
out that not all seeming disagreements may actually be substantive. 
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that world contains seven objects (for it also contains three pairs and a trio, which the Polish 
Logician counts as objects), then the statement is no less objectively true. In other words, 
given three atoms, it is objectively true that there are only three objects within a “Carnapian 
world” and it is equally objectively true that there are seven objects within a “Polish world”.
30
 
Thus, when one turns to consider religious plurality, any particular faith-stance could come 
with its own set of objective truths that are non-commensurate with those of other belief 
systems.
31
 
 Equally, internalist pluralism is not simply a version of religious subjectivism, where 
“truths” are demoted to whatever the believer takes them to be. For internalist pluralism is no 
more a form of mere subjectivism than is internal realism. Given a world comprising three 
atoms and their aggregates, “the Polish Logician” is objectively wrong if he thinks that there 
are ten objects, just as “the Carnapian” is objectively wrong if, given a world comprising 
three atoms, she thinks that there are only two. While the number of objects in the world is 
conceptual-scheme dependent, that number is not a matter of subjective taste. One can easily 
get the number wrong. Furthermore, getting the number wrong is not simply a case of 
disagreeing with those who share one’s conceptual scheme. What counts as an object is 
conceptual-scheme dependent. But once a conceptual scheme has determined what is to count 
                                                 
30
C.f. Paul Boghossian, who, notwithstanding his strong inclination towards a form of metaphysical realism, 
nevertheless writes: “our choice of one conceptual scheme rather than another…probably reflects various 
contingent facts about our capacities and limitations, so that a thinker with different capacities and limitations, a 
Martian for example, might find it natural to employ a different conceptual scheme. This does nothing to show 
that our conceptual scheme is incapable of expressing objective truths. Realism is not committed to there being 
only one vocabulary in which objective truths might be expressed; all it’s committed to is the weaker claim that, 
once a vocabulary is specified, it will then be an objective matter whether or not assertions couched in that 
vocabulary are true of false”. Paul Boghossian, “What the Sokal Hoax Ought to Teach Us: The Pernicious 
Consequences and Internal Contradictions of ‘Postmodernist’ Relativism”, Times Literary Supplement, 
December 13, 1996: 15. 
31
Moreover, once a conceptual scheme is established, it is likely to have a formative effect upon the experience 
of those who subscribe to it. Thus, those who subscribe to a conceptual scheme in which the Virgin Mary is 
taken to be an important figure are more likely to interpret an experience, if it is veridical, as “an experience of 
the Virgin Mary” than are those for whom Kali is more important. Subscription to a particular religious 
conceptual scheme, then, will incline a person to experience the “objects” recognized within that scheme, if 
those objects are there to be perceived within it—just as “the Polish Logician” will be more sensitive to 
perceiving aggregates. This is not to claim, however, that one’s conceptual scheme fully determines the objects 
that one will experience. It is interesting to note that Hick defends a not-too-dissimilar characterization of the 
relationship between our beliefs and our experience in Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, op. cit. 
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as an object, then if there are any objects, the objects are there to be counted.
32
 
 It should be clear by now that internalist pluralism, like internal realism, is a metaphysical 
theory concerned with the nature of truth-claims within different conceptual schemes. It does 
not, however, comprise an assessment of the truth-value of those truth-claims. Internalist 
pluralism, then, is certainly not committed to the claim that the various truth-claims made 
within different religious conceptual schemes are all true. Indeed, it is logically possible, 
according to internalist pluralism, that all the truth-claims within every religious conceptual 
scheme are false; just as it is logically possible that only one religious conceptual scheme 
contains truth-claims that actually are true.
33
 Given this, internalist pluralism is not 
committed to the view that all religious conceptual schemes are equally successful (where 
success is measured in terms of what proportion of a conceptual scheme’s significant truth-
claims turn out to be true). Furthermore, because it does not presume that all religious 
conceptual schemes will necessarily be equally successful, internalist pluralism is consistent 
with a person coming to judge that the religious conceptual scheme she had hitherto 
employed was inadequate. But on the other hand, it is also logically possible, according to 
internalist pluralism, that all truth-claims within every major religious conceptual scheme are 
true, even though the claims made by adherents to different religious traditions might sound 
radically different.
34
 
                                                 
32
For as Putnam makes clear in the Preface to Reason, Truth and History: “I shall advance a view in which the 
mind does not simply ‘copy’ a world which admits of description by One True Theory. But my view is not a 
view in which the mind makes up the world, either (or makes it up subject to constraints imposed by 
‘methodological canons’ and mind-independent ‘sense-data’)”. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, op. cit., p. 
xi. 
33
Although it is a logical possibility, it seems most unlikely that a long-lived religious conceptual scheme (such 
as the conceptual schemes of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.) would contain only false 
claims. Within a conceptual scheme the interaction of belief and experience would seem to stack the odds 
against that scheme being entirely constituted by false beliefs. 
34
This might seem indistinguishable from the view defended by Joseph Runzo. See, Joseph Runzo, Reason, 
Relativism and God (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). However, Runzo’s goal is to explain how it is that 
religious believers are entitled to absolute certainty about their religious beliefs, even though they recognize that 
all of those beliefs are conceptual-scheme dependent. But a realist holds that one can have a justification for 
feeling certain about the truth of a proposition without the proposition in question being true. In other words, 
even though Runzo holds that religious beliefs are conceptual-scheme dependent, his position, unlike the view I 
am here advocating, is not realist. And whereas internal realism is not a form of “metaphysical realism”, it 
remains a form of realism. 
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Side-stepping the major problems in Hick’s theory 
 
In order to indicate some of the advantages in adopting the perspective of internalist 
pluralism, allow me to indicate briefly how it avoids the seven major problems that currently 
beset the Hickean theory of religious pluralism, and which, notwithstanding the latter’s 
sensitivity to cultural diversity, invite a paradigm shift away from it. In what follows, I refer 
to Hick’s theory of religious pluralism as “transcendental pluralism” in order to distinguish it 
from internalist pluralism. 
 One problem with Hickean transcendental pluralism is that, in separating religious 
phenomena from their supposedly noumenal source, Hick is compelled to describe religions 
as other than their adherents take them to be.
35
 In particular, he insists that the “gods” which 
religious believers worship are not the real thing. While this does not place one religion above 
any other, it nevertheless appears to imply that all believers are to some extent mistaken in 
their beliefs. 
 Internalist pluralism allows religious beliefs to be taken much more seriously. It considers 
them in their own terms, and does not necessarily demand a re-description of anything that 
believers would typically say about their religious belief system. Internalist pluralism may 
thus leave the claims of religious believers exactly as it finds them. For example, a subscriber 
to internalist pluralism need have no difficulty in accepting both that, within a Christian 
conceptual scheme, “Jesus is the Son of God” is a true claim, and that, within a Muslim 
conceptual scheme, it is false—if, that is, in both conceptual schemes there is a God to be 
counted. Unlike the transcendental pluralist, an adherent of internalist pluralism is not, for 
example, compelled to propose a revisionist account of the divinity of Christ. 
 A second problem with transcendental pluralism is that, in applying the Kantian 
phenomena/noumena distinction to religion, Hick appears to have made it impossible to talk 
meaningfully of revelation. Claims about the divine communicating knowledge about itself to 
humans abound in the world’s religious traditions. Hick cannot take such claims seriously as, 
according to his theory, the religious noumenon is in principle unknowable.
36
 
                                                 
35
This is also the most common criticism of D. Z. Phillips’ revisionary account of the Christian belief system. 
Thus, given the argument that follows, internalist pluralism would seem to offer a more persuasive account of 
religious belief systems than does Phillips’ account. For an example of Phillips’ approach see D. Z. Phillips, 
Belief, Change and Forms of Life (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
36
Keith Ward’s rejection of Hickean pluralism revolves around just this criticism. See Keith Ward, Religion and 
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 Internalist pluralism simply side-steps this difficulty, for it drops any notion of the 
religious noumenon. Indeed, internalist pluralism rejects any conception of revelation that is 
wholly transcendent to the religious conceptual scheme. Claims about purportedly divine 
revelation must thus be assessed internally to the conceptual scheme in which they are lodged. 
This is consonant with the claim commonly made by theologians that what religious believers 
actually mean by claims such as “God spoke” can only be ascertained within the context of 
the appropriate tradition. It is a common view that anyone who assumed that they could 
legitimately interpret the claim “God spoke” in the same way that they would interpret the 
claim “the president spoke” would be assuming far too much. Precisely what it means for 
God to speak is regarded by an adherent of internalist pluralism as conceptual-scheme 
dependent, and this clearly fits with such widespread theological claims.
37
 
 A third problem is that Hick seems forced to appear cavalier with regard to genuine 
differences between religious traditions.
38
 In his view, the differences between religions are 
merely superficial, for each religion offers a valuable representation of, and way of 
experiencing, “the Real”. Thus, Hick does not regard differences in the claims made by 
adherents of different religions as of much significance. This belittles the importance that 
many believers invest in their religious truth-claims. 
 Clearly, internalist pluralism avoids this difficulty, for, as with the way in which it deals 
with the first problem with transcendental pluralism, in accepting bivalence with regard to 
statements within a conceptual scheme but not with respect to statements across conceptual 
schemes, it acknowledges that some statements that may be true within one faith-stance may 
well be false within another. And in considering religious beliefs in the terms of their 
believers, internalist pluralism thus has no difficulty whatsoever with accommodating the fact 
that believers consider there to be genuine differences between religious traditions. Hick, in 
effect, takes religious claims in one tradition ultimately to mean the same thing as religious 
claims in another tradition. Internalist pluralism, on the contrary, holds that claims made 
within one religious tradition may mean something very different to similar sounding claims 
                                                                                                                                                        
Revelation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 310–313. 
37
The abundance of literature within the world’s religious traditions concerning the divers mechanisms of divine-
human communication would thus seem to add weight to the view that the notion of revelation is itself 
conceptual-scheme dependent. 
38
This criticism is developed by Kenneth Surin in his critique of Hickean pluralism. See Kenneth Surin, “A 
politics of speech: religious pluralism in the age of the Macdonald’s hamburger” in G. D’Costa (ed.), Christian 
Uniqueness Reconsidered: the myth of a pluralistic theology of religions (New York: Orbis Books, 1990), pp. 
192–212. 
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made within another tradition, just as “the Polish Logician’s” claim that there are seven 
objects means something very different to a similar sounding claim in the mouth of “the 
Carnapian Logician”. And different religious traditions may disagree regarding what beings 
exist, just as “the Carnapian Logician” and “the Polish Logician” disagree regarding what 
objects exist. Hence, internalist pluralism takes religious differences far more seriously than 
does transcendental pluralism. 
 A fourth problem with transcendental pluralism is that, in claiming that the majority of 
religious truth-claims are mythological (or “practically true”), Hick presents an account of 
religious truth that appears far too weak. Unless religions can make propositional truth-
claims, they seem deprived of the ability to convey genuine information.
39
 
 Again, internalist pluralism simply side-steps this problem. For according to an adherent 
of internalist pluralism, religious claims may be objectively true (or not) within the particular 
religious framework or faith-stance in which they are proposed. Indeed, within any religious 
conceptual scheme, some claims may well be unconditionally true. 
 A fifth problem with transcendental pluralism is that it fails to provide a convincing 
account of religions such as Buddhism. Religions that do not recognize an ultimate divine 
figure will always appear anomalous on Hick’s theory. 
 Internalist pluralism can account quite naturally for all religious phenomena. Buddhism 
presents no special problem, nor do impersonal concepts of deity (such as nirguna Brahman). 
For unlike Hickean transcendental pluralism, internalist pluralism does not require the 
religious beliefs of, say, a Buddhist to refer to phenomena that are ostensibly generated by the 
same noumenon that supposedly generates the phenomena recognized within other world 
religions. 
A sixth problem concerns Hick’s insistence that all religions, ultimately, encourage 
people to move towards the same goal, which, he claims, comprises a shift from self-
centeredness to reality-centeredness. Hence, he argues that core religious concepts such as 
“salvation”, “nirvana” and “moksha” are all roughly equivalent. Yet this seems highly 
implausible,
40
 not least because each of these concepts surely derives its meaning from the 
intellectual system in which it is embedded. Moreover, for a religious practitioner to fully 
understand the meaning of “nirvana”, say, then he or she would have to accrue the relevant 
                                                 
39
Peter Byrne criticizes Hick’s theory on these grounds. See Peter Byrne, “John Hick’s Philosophy of World 
Religions”, Scottish Journal of Theology 35 (1982): 296. 
40
Harold Netland offers such a criticism of Hick in Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Quest for 
Truth (Leicester: Apollos, 1991). Netland also advances the first four criticisms noted above. 
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experience—a process that might take many years. It thus seems indefensible simply to 
assume that those who lack that particular experience have an adequate understanding of the 
concept “nirvana”. Consequently, it seems indefensible simply to assume that “nirvana” and 
“salvation” are co-extensive. 
 Internalist pluralism involves no such implausible claims. It acknowledges that the 
meaning of the core concepts of a religion is only accessible within that religious belief 
system. Nor does a subscriber to internalist pluralism have to claim that all religions share the 
same goal. For an adherent of internalist pluralism will claim that the “object” which 
constitutes any religious goal will, in part,
41
 be dependent upon the faith-stance of those 
seeking to attain that goal, and that different faith-stances identify different “objects”. Thus, 
there is no need to ignore or misdescribe the diverse data offered by the various world 
religions. 
 A seventh problem with transcendental pluralism is that Hick seems driven to offer a 
highly implausible account of morally motivated atheists. To cut a long story short, he ends 
up characterizing them as, in effect, anonymous theists who are best viewed as responding to 
“the Real” (which, as we have noted, is how he refers to the mooted noumenal reality lying 
behind religious experience). Yet surely this is susceptible to the same criticism that Hick 
himself has leveled against Karl Rahner’s theory of the “anonymous Christian”,
42
 namely that 
it is both patronizing to the atheist and lacking in epistemic justification.
43
 
 Interestingly, the existence of morally motivated atheists seems to provide further grounds 
for subscribing to an internal realist theory of pluralism in preference to Hick’s Kantian 
variety. For there is nothing preventing internalist pluralism from taking the beliefs of all 
morally motivated individuals equally seriously, whether their belief systems are religious or 
secular. And this is because, in contradistinction to metaphysical realism, internal realism 
does not presume that some noumenon, never mind that the same noumenon, must ultimately 
                                                 
41
I say “in part” here because there is a sense in which objects are conceptual-scheme dependent and a sense in 
which they are, what we might inadequately call, “world-dependent”. That a world comprising three atoms only 
contains three objects depends upon one’s employing the Carnapian’s conceptual scheme as opposed to the 
Polish Logician’s. But there is also a sense in which the fact that there are only three objects does not. For it 
equally depends on there not being four or more atoms. 
42
For Rahner’s notion of the “anonymous Christian”, see Karl Rahner, “Anonymous Christians” in Theological 
Investigations, Vol. 6 (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1969), pp. 390–398.  
43
In a Horizon Lecture delivered at Birkbeck College, University of London on January 14
th
, 2000, entitled “Is 
Christianity the only true religion?”, Hick criticized Rahner’s theory for being both patronizing to adherents of 
non-Christian faiths and epistemically unjustifiable. 
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lie behind all moral and religious phenomena. 
 
Defending internalist pluralism 
 
Despite such appealing features of internalist pluralism, ultimately its acceptability would 
seem to depend upon the plausibility of internal realism. Perhaps the most vigorous and 
influential critic of internal realism is William Alston. If Alston has succeeded in his critique 
of internal realism, then advocating internalist pluralism would seem pointless. So, in this 
final section I shall defend internalist pluralism by responding to, what I take to be, Alston’s 
principal objection to internal realism. 
 Alston’s main charge would appear to be that internal realism is internally incoherent 
because, he claims, its account of conceptual schemes generates a vicious, infinite regress. 
Alston concludes that in order to be intelligible, a conceptual scheme will require a meta-
conceptual scheme which will in turn require a meta-meta-conceptual scheme, and so on ad 
infinitum.
44
 He argues that this vicious regress is a consequence of internal realism’s 
insistence that all objects are conceptual-scheme dependent. For once the conceptual-scheme 
dependence of objects is accepted, the objection goes, one is committed to the meta-
conceptual-scheme dependence of conceptual schemes because the latter are no less objects.
45
 
But, in response, while it is true that, according to internal realism, one cannot conceive of 
objects existing outside of all conceptual schemes, and while it might well appear to follow 
that one cannot conceive of conceptual schemes existing outside of a meta-conceptual scheme 
that allows one to view conceptual schemes as objects, a person can, nevertheless, conceive 
of objects as existing, given her conceptual scheme, without possessing any conception of a 
conceptual scheme as itself an object. Meta-conceptual schemes are tools of higher level 
                                                 
44
See William P. Alston, A Sensible Metaphysical Realism (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 
2002), pp. 32f. 
45
Furthermore, according to Alston, internal realism is committed to two claims that together give rise to a petitio 
principii. First, all objects are dependent upon some conceptual scheme. Second, conceptual schemes are 
dependent upon human minds. But these two claims entail, in Alston view, both that conceptual schemes are 
dependent upon human minds, and that human minds are objects conceived within conceptual schemes and 
hence are dependent upon them, which seems circular. Ibid., p. 33. But the internal realist can easily respond that 
the “dependence” is not of the same sort, and hence the objection rests upon an equivocation. Conceptual 
schemes are dependent upon human minds in the sense that human minds create conceptual schemes. But the 
internal realist does not hold that conceptual schemes create minds. Rather, conceptual schemes determine what 
“the human mind” means. 
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interpretation; they do not identify the objects within an everyday world. And whereas, 
according to internal realism, one needs a conceptual scheme if one is to identify what exists 
within a world, that world can be adequately comprehended without a meta-conceptual 
scheme identifying as an object the conceptual scheme that identifies the objects within the 
everyday world. Putting the point another way, one certainly needs a language for statements 
within that language to make sense. And one might well require a meta-language if one is to 
talk about language without generating self-referential paradoxes. But one does not need a 
meta-language in order for everyday statements within a language to be comprehensible. 
Similarly, one is not driven to a dependence upon some meta-conceptual scheme for objects 
to be identified by a conceptual scheme. Put yet another way, if statements can makes sense 
within a language, as they clearly can, even if talking about a language without generating 
problems of self-referentiality requires a meta-language, then conceptual schemes can 
successfully identify objects within those schemes even if a meta-conceptual scheme is 
required in order to identify a conceptual scheme as an object. 
In a word, then, the conceptual-scheme dependence of objects no more generates an 
infinite regress than does the language-dependence of sentences. And if, contrary to fact, the 
language-dependence of sentences generated an infinite regress such that statements in a 
language could not make sense without the language making sense within a meta-language, 
and so on ad infinitum, then no statement would make sense. But then, any assumption that 
an infinite regress is entailed by the language dependence of statements would consist of a 
statement that only made sense given a language that only made sense given a meta-language, 
and so on, which would itself entail that any such statement was meaningless, given the 
obvious fact that statements clearly are language dependent. In other words, no such critique 
can be stated without its entailing that the critique is meaningless. And if this constitutes a 
reductio ad absurdum of the denial that statements are language dependent, then, given the 
parallels between language dependence and conceptual-scheme dependence, Alston’s critique 
of internal pluralism must surely be unsound. 
A more interesting variation on Alston’s objection would be to argue that an infinite 
regress of conceptual schemes is generated by the need to posit a meta-conceptual scheme in 
order to explain how individuals can switch between conceptual schemes. The objector might 
hold that, for example, in order to explain how someone could move from a Christian 
conceptual scheme to a Muslim one, and back again, the internal realist would need to posit a 
meta-conceptual scheme that could be employed to “translate” the Christian conceptual 
scheme into the Muslim one, and vice versa. However, in response, it would seem that if one 
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had been able to immerse oneself fully both in a Christian and in a Muslim way of life, then 
one could easily move from a Christian conceptual scheme to a Muslim conceptual scheme 
and back again, without the need for a meta-conceptual scheme in order to do so. For just as 
one can easily move from “It’s raining” to “Il pleut”, and back again, without the need for 
either a linguistic or a meta-linguistic theory, then, analogously, one does not require a meta-
conceptual scheme in order to switch from one conceptual scheme to another. 
However, if one does want to understand how Christian and Muslim conceptual schemes 
fit together into a wider theoretical picture, then one does require a meta-conceptual scheme, 
such as internalist pluralism, in order to do so. But then, what about an alternative meta-
conceptual scheme? If one fully understood both that alternative—Hickean transcendental 
pluralism, say—and internalist pluralism, one could move from one meta-conceptual scheme 
to another without the need for an even higher level theory. Hence, because one can operate 
within any such theoretical system without a higher theoretical system being necessary, no 
infinite regress is generated.  
One advantage of positing the theory of internalist pluralism as a meta-conceptual scheme 
is that it enables two conceptual schemes to be taken equally seriously. A danger of those 
within one conceptual scheme thinking about another conceptual scheme is that they may 
well think about it solely in terms of their own conceptual scheme, which, in effect, is to 
reduce the other conceptual scheme to a poorly understood subset of their own worldview. A 
multicultural world surely requires avoiding the kinds of misunderstandings that such an 
attitude can give rise to. Hence, if Christians and Muslims, for example, are to begin to 
understand each other adequately, internalist pluralism provides a useful meta-conceptual 
scheme for so doing. 
But it might then be objected that adherents of internalist pluralism run the danger of 
failing fully to understand alternative meta-conceptual schemes. So, isn’t a meta-meta-
conceptual scheme required? It seems to me that adherents of different meta-conceptual 
schemes very often fail to understand each other adequately. Realists and anti-realists, for 
example, often seem to talk past each other, and it may well be advantageous to seek a meta-
meta-conceptual scheme in order to avoid misunderstandings at the level of meta-conceptual 
schemes. But in order to understand how two conceptual schemes relate, it is not necessary to 
posit a meta-meta-conceptual scheme. One only requires a meta-conceptual scheme. Hence, 
no vicious, infinite regress is generated. 
In short, to understand how the things in a world relate together, one requires a conceptual 
scheme; and to understand how conceptual schemes relate together, one requires a meta-
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conceptual scheme. To understand how meta-conceptual schemes relate together, one would 
require a meta-meta-conceptual scheme. But a conceptual scheme does not require a meta-
conceptual scheme for it to work. Only if, in order to understand how things relate in a world, 
one required a conceptual scheme, which itself required a meta-conceptual scheme, which 
likewise required a meta-meta-conceptual scheme, and so on ad infinitum, would an infinite 
regress be generated. So, in order to understand another conceptual scheme fully, it would, 
admittedly, be advantageous to go to a higher theoretical level. But one does not require a 
higher theoretical level in order to understand the objects within one’s own conceptual 
scheme. Now, one might gain a higher understanding of one’s own conceptual scheme—
especially of its limitations—by going to a higher level. But that is not required for one’s 
scheme to be workable. And only if the theory of internalist pluralism advocated here made a 
conceptual scheme unworkable without going to a higher level would the theory be 
susceptible to Alston’s critique. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that internalist pluralism takes all religious beliefs much more seriously than do 
other approaches to the problems posed by religious plurality. And it does so by discarding 
any notion of the religious noumenon. It requires nothing that is transcendent to whichever 
religious conceptual scheme is in question.
46
 It is in a position to acknowledge the genuine 
differences between religious traditions because it is able to accept that some statements 
might be true within one faith-stance even while being false within another. Indeed, 
internalist pluralism goes so far as to accept that religious statements may be objectively true 
within the relevant faith-stance. Moreover, the religious phenomena of all traditions are given 
prima facie equal weighting, and none need be re-described in a manner that brings them 
closer to other traditions. Nor does internalist pluralism have any need to re-describe the core 
concepts or the goals of any religious tradition. Finally, internalist pluralism has no difficulty 
in regarding the conceptual schemes of atheists as being on a par with those of religious 
believers, nor is it compelled to re-describe or put in question atheistic moral motivation. It 
seems to me that these constitute considerable advantages over other approaches to the 
plurality of religious and secular belief systems. 
                                                 
46
Note: internalist pluralism does not rule out the possibility of a being that is transcendent to our experience. It 
only rules out a being that is transcendent to all conceptual schemes. For the notion of “transcendent to our 
experience” has to be understood within a conceptual scheme. 
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 In conclusion, then, internalist pluralism succeeds in accounting for the considerable 
differences between the various world religions, while remaining sensitive to cultural 
diversity, and while also managing to avoid the pitfalls in John Hick’s transcendental 
religious pluralism. All of this suggests that internalist pluralism constitutes a superior 
paradigm. 
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